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to underline the importance of the notion, coined
by Herbert Simon, of subjective rationality, to clarify its definition and meaning, to show that the intuition lying behind this notion is actually an implicit cornerstone of many classical sociological theories, and finally to suggest that this notion is crucial in the analysis of many types of social phenomena.
As I must be selective, I will consider notably the important case of the rational explanation of false beliefs.
A. What subjective rationality really means H. Simon (1982) has proposed several definitions of his notion of subjective rationality.
One of these is the following:
"In a broad sense," he writes, "rationality denotes a style of behavior that is appropriate to the achievement of given goals, within the limits imposed by certain conditions and constraints".
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And he adds:
"The conditions and constraints referred to in the general definition may be objective characteristics, or they may be characteristics of the organism itself that it takes as fixed and not subject to its own control.
The line between the first case and the other two is sometimes drawn by distinguishing objective rationality, on the one hand, from subjective or bounded rationality, on the other" (Simon (1982) , II, 8.1)].
I am not sure this definition is entirely satisfactory. But, rather than discussing it, I will introduce the notion of subjective rationality by a deictic definition, i.e. by an example. I will use an example used by Simon (1982, II, p. 134) himself and borrowed from Feldman's (1963) work in cognitive experimental psychology.
Subjects are asked by an experimenter to predict the outcomes of a head-and-tail game. They are informed, however, that the coin used in the game is biased and that head and tail will appear respectively with probabilities .8 and .2.
In most cases, the subjects choose a wrong solution:
they generate a sequence of outcomes governed by the same probabilities as the series they are supposed to predict. In other words, they choose to predict randomly the outcome "head" with probability . 8 and the outcome "tail" with probability .2. By so doing, they
Boudon: Subjective rationality 7 predict correctly the outcomes with probability .68.
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This is a poor result compared to the result they would get if they would choose to predict head at all moves, since their probability of predicting correctly each outcome would in this case be equal to .8.
This example seems to me extremely important for several reasons.
First, it illustrates a case where the behavior of a subject is governed by reasons, which, although they are objectively wrong, are perceived as good. Very often the importance of this case is ill-recognized because it runs against a current view grounded in an old philosophical tradition which assimilates groundedness and objective validity.
This raises of course the question as to how and with the help of which criteria these reasons, which have the curious property of being both invalid and good, can be identified. The answer to this question is not immediate, but we check readily that we recognize the existence of such good reasons in the linguistic expressions we use normally: thus, we would likely explain the behavior of the subjects in the experiment I have reported by a sentence such as "they had good reasons to choose this wrong solution since ... ", rather than by a formula of type "they had really no reasons of choosing this wrong solution, but ... ". In other words, we consider normally their behavior as rational rather than irrational.
Since (.8 x .8) + (.2 x .2) .68.
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Why are the reasons of the subjects perceived as good while they are wrong? Because they tried to answer the question they were confronted with by making a guess, a conjecture, by applying a theory or a general principle valid in many cases.
Suppose for instance the experimenter would ask them to predict a mathematical series governed by rules as:
rule 1: y is the value of the first member of the series;
rule 2: add x to the n-th member of the series to get the following member.
If the subjects would decide to use these rules, they would guess the outcomes correctly. Or suppose they would be asked to guess the outcomes of a normal headand-tail game played with an unbiased coin. In that case, the strategy which was wrong in the case of a biased coin becomes right. By tossing an unbiased coin in order to predict the outcomes obtained by the experimenter, the subject has a probability or .s of predicting correctly the outcome.
2 This is neither better nor worse than the outcome he would obtain by predicting at each move either head or tail.
On the whole, the subjects made the conjecture that, in order to replicate a model, a good strategy is to generate the copy by applying the very rules which govern the production of the model. This conjecture is obviously valid in many circumstances. It is valid 2 Since ( . 5 x . 5) + ( . 5 x . 5) = . 5. This explains why few people would probably accept the idea that the subjects are irrational, though their reasons were objectively ungrounded. Their reasons are perceived as gooa because they ar~ universal in the sense that any subject in the same position, i.e. any subject who would not have been trained in probability calculus, would naturally come to the idea of using the generative rules of the model to produce the copy.
So, a first virtue of this example is to clarify the Simonian notion of subjective rationality better than the abstract definition I gave earlier. The example suggests namely that we tend normally to consider invalid reasons as good when these reasons are valid in many circumstances though not in all.
Another important point conveyed by the example is that subjective rationality is the product of the discordance between the complexity of the world and the cognitive capacities of the subject.
But the general conclusion to be drawn from the example is that, except in simple and marginal cases, action includes theories, conjectures or principles,
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Finally, and this will be the Leitmotiv of this lecture, while these conjectures, theories or principles may be true, valid or well-adapted, they may also without contradiction be untrue, invalid and still grounded.
B.
Why the notion of subjective rationality is crucial for the social sciences
Why is the notion of subjective rationality crucial for the social sciences?
Because, as Max Weber (1951) and Popper (1967) among others have suggested, trying to substitute rational explanations for the irrational explanations of behavior naturally produced by ordinary knowledge is one to the main tasks of the social sciences and even one of their main sources of legitimation.
But, as long as we do not perceive the importance of the notion of subjective rationality, and endorse a narrow definition of rationality -reasons are good when they are objectively good -we tend to see too easily behavior as irrational~ And this is true not only of ordinary social knowledge, but of scientific sociology as well. In a fascinating text in political theory, Hume (1963) develops the assumption that political parties bring together people according to three basic mechanisms:
interests, solidarity, and principles.
In the first case, people are motivated to affiliate to a given party because they have similar social positions and consequently common interests. This explains his choice of the word ideology in the formulation of his main theorem. What Downs has taught us can be more plainly described by saying that, as
Simon's subjects, the voter tries to meet the situation he is faced to with the help of reasonable con-jectures or theories, for instance the conjecture that _ a program grounded on certain principles will likely lead to consequences congruent with these principles.
Of course, this is not always true: an equality-oriented policy can bring more inequality; by aiming at a goal one can reach the opposite outcome. But the assumption of congruence is in many cases a reasonable one, and, as a general guideline, better than the opposite assumption.
One could even go farther: for people with an interest in politics, judging a program on its principles can be a good conjecture. For less interested, it can be rational to use simpler signals: checking whether the candidate looks sincere for instance. In this case, the voter makes the conjecture that there is a correlation between this signal and the outcomes he is interested in, exactly as a businessman uses the vita of a candidate to a job as a signal of his future inobservable achievements.
On the whole, this Hume-Downs imaginary discussion can be considered as paradigmatic for several reasons.
It illustrates the strength of the classical view of rationality, which even Downs does not entirely get rid of.
It shows that, as soon as a more liberal view of rationality is adopted, the explanation of behavior becomes in many cases much easier: a type of behavior which Hume considered a mystery becomes easily understandable thanks to Downs' rational theory. Here as in the previous example, however, the substitution of a subjective rational explanation for an irrational one generates a definite feeling of progress.
Magical beliefs were actually interpreted by many writers as irrational. Thus, to Levy-Bruhl (1960) Wittgenstein (1975) .
This type of theory is neither less nor more ad hoe than the previous one. As well shown by Horton (1982) , it contradicts the beliefs of the "primitive" themselves, who appear to be absolutely convinced that their magical rituals are not only effective, but indispensable, even though they see clearly that these rituals are only complementary to the technical operations without which no crop would grow. But Horton has not only demonstrated that primitive really believe in the effectiveness of rain rituals, he has also produced a fascinating indirect argument against the expressive theory of magic when he has shown that Christianity, in spite of its success in many areas in black English-speaking Africa, has often failed to replace local beliefs because it had the defect to the eyes of the Africans of not proposing a toolbox of magical devices which seemed to them indispensable in the conduct of everyday life.
In fact, the good theory is the third one, i.e. the subjectively rational theory developed by several modern writers but suggested curiously enough in similar terms both by Durkheim (1979) Lakatos (1970) , Kuhn (1970) or Feyerabend (1976) , Durkheim (1962, p. 508-528) suggests that scientists have good reasons for doing so.
They can namely always hope that minor changes in the theory will make it compatible with facts, or doubt whether the facts contradictory with the theory are genuine facts or whether they are rather artefacts, etc. Moreover, a long time will often elapse before it can be ascertained which of these typical situations is created by the discovery of facts contradictory with the theory. So that it is as rational to try to save the theory as to try to replace it.
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For the same reasons, magicians can keep confidence in their theories even though they do not always work.
Exactly as scientists, they will without much difficulty devise auxiliary hypotheses to explain why the theory has failed.
Evans-Pritchard's (1968) The reasons for such beliefs lie simply in the fact that in such cases collinearity is often so powerful that it is practically impossible to check seriously whether or not x has really an effect on y. Thus, it has apparently been discovered recently after many years that the idea according to which stress would be a main cause of stomach ulcer is a magical belief, so On the whole, Durkheim suggests that the magical beliefs of the primitive are not different from ours.
The difference is that, because of the development of science, a number of old beliefs have become obsolete.
As a consequence, when we see other people still believing in them, we have a strong feeling of irrationality. But as soon as we evoke the causal relationships in which we believe ourselves on such existential problems as health for instance, we become conscious of the fact that magical and scientific knowledge coexist in primitive societies.
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Max Weber (1922, p. 227-228) wrote on his side that to the primitive, "the actions of the rainmaker are exactly as magical as the actions of the firemaker". He meant by this statement that the primitive has no reason to introduce the asymmetry between rain-and fire-making which we introduce ourselves, precisely because the process by which kinetic is transformed into thermi c energy is familiar to us. Reciprocally, the primitive to whom this process is unfamiliar has no reason to see a basic difference between fire-and rain-making.
So, Weber's as well as Durkheim's implicit diagnosis on magic is that the primitive should not be considered to be less rational than ourselves. When they are confronted with existential problems, they develop theories and conjectures, which they derive from the socially available body of knowledge. They are eventually ready to forget them as soon as they are proposed better theories. But as long as these theories are not available, they have also good reasons for believingas scientists -even in theories which repeatedly fail. Moreover, reality can reinforce rather than contradict their beliefs, even when these beliefs are false, as Durkheim has noted in one of the most brilliant parts of his analysis of magic.
We have here an example where substituting a subjective rational theory for a set of irrational interpretations gives a strong feeling of scientific progress.
By contrast with the other two types of theories, the rational theory of magic does not give this impression of being .ad hoe and arbitrary. It rests upon a set of Capital a rational explanation, however, which I reconstruct in the following way: to know that they are exploited, the workers should see the difference between their salary and the value of their work. But to determine the value of their work, they would have to master a complex economic theory, as well as a great deal of empirical information. As this is impossible and as they still want to know whether their salary is fair or not, they turn toward a natural substitute:
comparing their salary to the salary of the individual producer. But, by so doing, they introduce of course a bias in their estimation, the individual producer using more time to produce, say, a pair of shoes than the worker in a shoe manufacture. On the whole, they will agree to leave to the capitalist the gain resulting from the division of labor. But they will do so with good reasons. To illustrate this point, I will draw a first example from a polemical discussion which, once more, was started in France in the last few weeks on the question as to whether the cognitive level of youngsters tends to decline or to climb as an effect of the overall increase in education. I will leave aside the trivial point that checking the cognitive level of a population is more complicated than checking whether a book is on a table or not. For, even if we assume that cognitive levels can be easily observed, strong illusions about their evolution can still appear with good reasons in many heads.
To introduce my point, I will build a highly simpli- So, the false beliefs of our teachers are in no way illusions. On the contrary, they perceive the reality around them as it is. The false belief comes from the application of a principle which is in most cases alright, i.e. that observing whether x is y is a good way to determine whether x is y. This principle is effectively most often valid. But, as here, it can also lead with good reasons to beliefs in false statements.
Many examples of the same vein could be mentioned where subjective rationality produces false ideas or beliefs, where in other words subjects appear to be endorsing false ideas or beliefs with good reasons. I will add two further short examples in order to suggest that the idea is general.
According to a widely accepted point of the Keynesian theory, an increase in taxes has normally a deflationary effect. For the following reasons: it generates a decrease in the purchasing power, which in turn generates a decline in the demand for goods and services, and finally a decline in the prices of goods and services. Now, in a survey conducted by Katona (1951) , a sample of businessmen were asked whether an increase in taxes has deflationary or inflationary effects. A majority of them answered it should increase inflation. Why? Simply because they analyzed the question by reference to a situation familiar to them: when taxes climb, this has the effect of increasing the costs of production the businessman has to bear. Except in the case where the demand for his products is highly elastic with respect to price, he will normally try to transfer at least a part of this increase in his costs of production to the consumer by increasing the price of his products or services. From this simple mental experiment he concludes with excellent reasons that an increase in taxation should generate inflationary effects. In fact Shweder's interpretation was inspired to him because he perceived the answers of this nurses through the glasses of his scientists, because we manipulate currently contingency tables with their three (once N is known) degrees of freedom, we tend to consider as normal the situations where three degrees of freedom have to be taken into account before a causal statement can be proposed. And we do not see that in many cases it is sufficient to check that y follows frequently x to reach a reliable answer to the question as to whether x is the cause of y.
So, Shweder' s nurses are not more irrational than Simon's subjects in the experiment I reported at the beginning_ of this lecture. And it is more illuminating to interpret their answers -on the subjective rationality mode -as dictated by the application of principles which are currently valid while in some circumstances they are not.
Finally, using sound methodological principles, such as looking for instance whether x is y in order to know whether x is y, looking whether x and y appear frequently together to determine whether they are related can and often does lead to right ideas. But they can also lead to wrong ones. In other words sound principles can be the cause of false beliefs. A survey conducted by Boy and Michelat (1986) leads to the same kind of observations. between beliefs and level of education . But it seems plausible that the respondents with a higher education have finally good reasons for being less skeptical or critical on some subjects than those with less familiarity with the history of science. To summarize this case in an ironic fashion, I would say that the confidence in the scientific virtue of methodical doubt can occasionally lead to more credulity.
Many examples of the same vein could be mentioned.
Another respectable genuinely scientific idea is for instance the Keynesian theory according to which stimulating the demand for goods and services, for instance by distributing more purchasing power or reducing taxes, will stimulate the supply of goods and services and consequently reduce unemployment. This respectable and true idea can lead to dangerous beliefs, however, if it is forgotten that Keynes proposed it in an economic situation where aggregate demand was much below the potential supply. For in a business cycle where aggregate demand exceeds potential supply, stimulating the demand will produce inflation rather than a decrease in unemployment.
Thus, false beliefs are often generated by the most respectable and sometimes by the most genuinely scientific theories. When for instance the hidden assumptions of a theory remain unperceived, it can lead many people to believe with good reasons that x will produce y while it will actually produce z.
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When respectable mental procedures lead to falsebeliefs Very often, false ideas can also be generated by the procedures of thought, such as induction for instance.
As we know since Hume, though induction is logically ill-grounded, it is vital for everyday life and currently used in science. But it can generate false beliefs as in the case of those children who were asked by Balacheff ( 1987) to look at two triangles similar in all respects except size, the triangle ABC being greater than A'B'C', and to answer some questions about them. When they were asked whether the side AB is greater than A'B', they answered "yes". "Is BC greater than B'C'?" -answer: "yes". "Is AC greater than A'C'?" -answer: "yes". "Is the perimeter of ABC greater?" -answer: "yes". "The surface?" "yes".
"The sum of the angles of ABC" -answer: "yes".
Impeccable formal deductive procedures such as the syllogism, for instance, although leading in most cases to right conclusions will also eventually be responsible for false beliefs when they are used in an overconfident fashion. I am not thinking here of the sophistical use of correct deductive procedures which a Pareto ( 1935) had in mind when he criticized for instance these deductive arguments where the meaning of the same word changes from one statement to the next in the argument. Thus, he contended, the words "nature", "natural", etc. are used in many moral arguments to "prove" that something is good or bad. The arguments are often formally correct but they are sophistical because these words seem to be used with These implicit assumptions are always present. In most cases they are both unconscious and harmless. In other cases they lead to false beliefs.
This point is essential, since it underlines one of the basic mechanisms by which genuinely scientific arguments can provide the good reasons which inspire and consolidate false beliefs.
So, all kinds of usually valid and vital principles and mental procedures -induction, formal procedures such as the syllogism, sound principles such as the principle recommending to check empirically whether x is y in order to judge whether x is y, etc. -in other words the complex set of theories, procedures, principles which are used by subjective rationality are also basic mechanisms by which false ideas and beliefs can be grounded and consolidated.
Thus, the notion of subjective rationality sketches a paradigm in the frame of which all kinds of behaviors, including behaviors oriented against the interest of the subject, as well as all kinds of attitudes and beliefs, including magical beliefs and more generally beliefs in false ideas, can be more convincingly explained than with other paradigms.
More generally, the notion of subjective rationality seems to me a most important theoretical piece for all social sciences. Substituting subjective rational explanations for irrational explanations of behavior typically is a major form of progress in the social sciences, while reciprocally irrational explanations, because they tend to be easy, ad hoe, circular and empty are a main plague of sociology.
The fact that irrational explanations are of ten considered by sociologists to be natural can be detected for instance at the fact that many studies are based on correlational analyses interpreted in a causal naturalistic fashion. Thus, many sociologists will be satisfied to know that income, or class, say, have an influence on the probability of believing in God or in extraterrestrial beings, or on the probability of reaching a given educational level, and will often not even wonder whether or not reasons can explain the correlation.
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The appeal of irrational explanations of behavior to sociologists derives from several facts: the influence of the exoteric Marxian and Freudian tradition, but also the influence of the narrow definition of rationality according to which good reasons should be objectively grounded. The strength of this narrow definition comes itself from the fact that it is deeply rooted in a secular philosophical tradition.
Once the importance of this concept of subjective rationality is fully recognized, the strange division of labor between economists who tend to see the homo oeconomicus as narrowly rational and sociologists who of ten see the homo sociologicus as basically moved by forces located beyond his control will be attenuated, this is at least my guess, and replaced by a more interesting ideal-type, I mean the ideal-type of the motivated actor, i.e. of an actor who in many cases has good reasons to do what he does or to think what he thinks. A reaction against irrational explanations of behavior has appeared with the so-called new economics, as presented for instance by McKenzie and Tullock (1975) . This paradigm proposes to use a narrow definition and theory of rationality usual in classical economics in the analysis not only of economic behavior but of behaviors not belonging to the traditional field of economics. Very often this approach is presented as a reaction against the traditional sociological approach which is held as dominated by an irrational view of man. This verdict is true to some extent at least: the Weberian tradition seems to be less influential in sociology than the traditions which see the social actor as irrational. But the reaction to this verdict is not the right one -it seems to me. It is true that the narrow rational model can be applied to the analysis not only of economic behavior but to other types of behavior as well. But this model should be held as a particular case of a more general model.
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On the whole, the notion of subjective rationality sketches a general model cutting across the various disciplines: it expresses the idea that, except in simple situations where the social actor can follow the narrow rational model, he is normally confronted with ambiguous and complex situations and masters them by using theories, principles, conjectures, in other words by being intellectually more active than both sociologists and economists recognize.
For all these reasons, the notion of subjective rationality appears to me to be one of the most strategic concepts for the development of the social sciences.
